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services;95 the exigencies of urgency;96 or where national defence requires continued
business dealings with the listed contractor.97 The upshot is that any waivers must be
necessary to prevent a severe disruption of the agency’s operation to the detriment of
the Government or the general public.98
The possibility that any debarment against BAE may be waived remains a real one,
if one draws an analogy with the recent high-proﬁle suspension (temporary debarment
of up to 18 months)99 of Boeing from US public contracts. This suspension was twice
lifted to permit Boeing to receive substantial contracts from the US Government,100
and it has been argued that the consolidation of the defence industry in the US has
made it impossible to suspend or debar major defence ﬁrms from public contracts.101
In addition, the lack of competition that follows the exit of a major contractor from the
marketplace as a result of a debarment102 has in the past led to price increases for the
Government—another reason behind Boeing’s short-lived suspension from US
Government contracts.
Although BAE may survive its conviction and possible subsequent debarment in the
US, the conviction of BAE in the US may have potential consequences for the com-
pany’s business in the European Union. This is because, in 2004, the latest revision to
the European Community (EC) procurement directives103 made it mandatory for
contracting authorities in the EC to exclude or debar ﬁrms that had received a con-
viction for corruption.104 This means that if BAE is convicted of corruption in the US,
EC contracting authorities will be required to exclude BAE from obtaining public
contracts in the EC. This might mean that future contracts from countries like the UK,
Sweden and Denmark, where BAE has signiﬁcant interests, may be in jeopardy.
SOPE WILLIAMS*
IV. THE GOVERNANCE OF BRITAIN
One of the ﬁrst actions of the Government of Prime Minister Gordon Brown, who took
ofﬁce on 27 June 2007, was to publish a Green Paper called ‘The Governance of
Britain’.1 Although the document looks forward to the possibility of a comprehensive,
[ICLQ vol 57, January 2008 pp 209–217] doi:10.1017/S0020589308000110
95 DFARS 209.405 (a) (i). 96 DFARS 209.405 (a) (ii).
97 DFARS 209.405 (a) (iv). 98 FAR 23.506 (e).
99 FAR 9.407-1.
100 J Zucker, ‘The Boeing Suspension: Has Increased Consolidation Tied the United
States Department of Defense’s Hands’ (2004) 5 PPLR 260. 101 ibid 262.
102 A Schutz, ‘Too Little Too Late: An Analysis of the General Service Administra-
tion’s Proposed Debarment of WorldCom’ (2004) 65 Administrative L Rev 1263, 1273.
103 Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of March 31 2004 on
the co-ordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts
and public service contracts [2004] OJ L/134/114 (hereafter public sector directive); Directive
2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council co-ordinating the procurement pro-
cedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors [2004] OJ
L134/1 (hereafter utilities directive).
104 Art 45 public sector directive. See Williams (n 80) 715.
* School of Law, University of Nottingham.
1 ‘The Governance of Britain’ Cm 7170 (July 2007) (‘GB’). See also the Prime Minister
statement to the House of Commons, Hansard HC vol 462 col 815–(3 July 2007).
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written constitution, this is seen not as an inevitable prospect and, particularly, not
an immediate one.2 The main concerns at the moment are the formalization and even
restriction of certain executive powers and increasing the accountability for the exer-
cise of governmental power, in and out of Parliament.3 The importance of the Green
Paper to international lawyers is that its substantial focus is on the prerogative powers
exercised by ministers, many of which concern the conduct of foreign affairs and
are directly relevant to or touch indirectly on matters of international law. The Green
Paper sets out a list of seven main areas where the Government exercises prerogative
powers. Six of them have direct or consequential relations with international law.
They are:
. Deploying and using the Armed Forces overseas;
. Making and ratifying treaties;
. Issuing, refusing, impounding and revoking passports;
. Acquiring and ceding territory;
. Conducting diplomacy; and
. Sending and receiving ambassadors.4
As FAMann indicated in his well-known book, Foreign Affairs in the English Courts,5
in the UK foreign affairs are conducted largely by means of prerogative powers. The
result is that accountability for the exercise of executive power is more limited than if
the powers had a statutory basis. The domination of the House of Commons by the
Government, including its control over the Commons timetable, means that political
accountability for the use of prerogative powers is limited. As for judicial control, even
where there is jurisdiction, it is constrained by considerations of justiciability. This is
not to say the old orthodoxies insulating the prerogative have remained unchanged.
Statute has occupied some of the ground once within the purview of the prerogative
(such as the War Powers Act 1965 and the Immigration Act 1971). Government has
said that it would no longer rely on certain prerogative powers (for instance, the power
to recognize foreign governments).6 After the GCHQ case,7 the courts have assumed
authority over some exercises of the prerogative (the issuing of passports,8 the
government of dependent territories9), though making it clear at the same time that
other matters remained beyond their jurisdiction (entering into treaties and other treaty
actions, such making reservations).10 Practices with respect to the exercise of other
2 GB para 213. 3 GB paras 14–19. 4 GB para 22, Box 2.
5 FA Mann, Foreign Affairs in English Courts (OUP, Oxford, 1986).
6 See S Talmon, ‘Recognition of Governments: An Analysis of the New British Policy and
Practice’ (1992) 63 BYIL 231.
7 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1983] UKHL 6 (GCHQ).
8 RV Foreign Secretary Ex P Everett [1988] EWCA Civ 7.
9 On the saga of the Chagos Islanders, see S Allen, ‘Looking beyond the Bancoult cases:
International Law and the Prospect of Resettling the Chagos Islands’ (2007) 7 Human Rights
L Rev 441. The latest judgment is Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs v
R (Bancoult) [2007] EWCA 498.
10 See GCHQ (n 5), per Lord Roskill: ‘I do not think that that right of challenge can be
unqualiﬁed. It must, I think, depend upon the subject matter of the prerogative power which is
exercised . . . I do not think [some prerogative powers] could properly be made the subject of
judicial review. Prerogative powers such as those relating to the making of treaties, the defence of
the realm . . . are not, I think, susceptible to judicial review because their nature and subject matter
is such as not to be amenable to the judicial process. The courts are not the place wherein to
210 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
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prerogative powers have modiﬁed the ways in which they have been used, even to the
extent that constitutional conventions have been established about what should happen,
such as the transmutation of the Ponsonby Rule about the publication of treaties from a
statement of one government’s policy into a fully ﬂedged convention.11 Other practices
are less well-established, such as consultations about ratiﬁcation of treaties12 or about
the form of legislation necessary to implement them:13 these have been ad hoc ini-
tiatives. Prominently (and not without relevance to the political climate in which the
Government’s proposals are being made, perhaps), the Government put to a vote in the
Commons its decision to use force against Iraq in March 2003 and gained the support
of the House (even if not of a majority of its own supporters). The then Leader of the
House told the Commons in January 2007 that Prime Minister Blair’s statement that it
was now inconceivable that there would be a future deployment of troops overseas
without consultation of the Commons was ‘the convention we have established’;14
possibly a premature conclusion.
Although the current of recent concern about the prerogative began to run before the
invasion of Iraq,15 it is the question of the power to deploy the armed forces overseas
which has enjoyed the greatest salience, given the political and legal controversies
which accompanied the action and which have persisted since. There have been several
unsuccessful attempts to introduce legislation which would submit a government’s
power to varying degrees of parliamentary control. The House of Lords Committee on
the Constitution recommended the development of a convention in the manner of the
Ponsonby Rule to assure a measure of parliamentary participation in future.16 The
response of the Blair Government was a peremptory rejection of the Committee’s
recommendation,17 which in turn received an indignant reply from the Committee.18
It now feels itself vindicated by the ‘Governance of Britain’ Green Paper,19 because
the Green Paper, in one of the two prerogative powers it treats in any detail, accepts
more or less the Constitution Committee’s proposal on the deployment power
(see below).
One of the factors which generated the most strenuous differences immediately
before the invasion of Iraq, differences which have continued to be aired since, was
determine whether a treaty should be concluded or the armed forces disposed in a particular
manner . . .’.
11 See<http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kﬁle/ponsonbyrule,0.pdf>.
12 FCO Consultation on the UN Treaty on Jurisdictional Immunities of States.
13 Consultation of the International Criminal Court Bill, which had some impact on the
International Criminal Court Act 2001.
14 Hansard HC vol 455 col 19 (8 Jan 2007).
15 Commons Select Committee on Public Administration, ‘Taming the Prerogative:
Strengthening Ministerial Accountability’ (2004) HC 422. (The inquiry had started before March
2003.)
16 ‘Waging war: Parliament’s role and responsibility’ Volume I: Report (2006) HL 236-I.
I was the special adviser to the Committee on this matter. None of the material in this note should
be taken to implicate the Committee in anyway and all information is based on public sources.
17 ‘Government’s Response to the House of Lords Constitution Committee’s Report’ (2006)
Cm 6923.
18 ‘Waging War: Parliament’s Role and Responsibility’. Follow-up (2007) HL 51. See also
Hansard HL vol 691 col 979 (1 May 2007) and Hansard HC vol 460 col 481 (17 May 2007) for
debates on the deployment power.
19 ‘The Governance of Britain’ (2007) HL158, para 4.
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concerns about the information which was revealed to the House of Commons before
the vote. There were two questions—what was the Commons to know and what was
the quality of the information which was provided to it. Of the many matters can-
vassed—intelligence, strategic and tactical assessments, the objectives of the de-
ployment—I shall deal here with only one matter, that is the legal justiﬁcation for the
conﬂict. Because of the nature of the prerogative, the legality of the Iraq operation
could be measured only against the standards of international law. Although it
does not loom large (or even at all) in the speciﬁcations of the Attorney-General’s
responsibilities, in his role as the Government’s chief legal adviser, he is the source
of its international legal advice (except, as in Suez, when he isn’t).20 The
complication of the Attorney-General’s status and duties is not restricted to questions
of international law and it has raised political interest comparable to that about the
exercise of the deployment power.21 It is not a surprise that consideration of the
Attorney-General’s functions features in the ‘Governance of Britain’ Green Paper22
and that a consultation paper has already been circulated by the Ministry of Justice.23
The deep divisions which have persisted about the legitimacy of the Iraq operation
indicate that concerns about government decision-making go further than con-
siderations about the formal basis of its powers, so that if the reforms are to meet
objections, attention will have to be given to the substantive matters as well. The Green
Paper acknowledges this for intelligence information24 but not, explicitly, for its legal
advice.
A. Prerogative Powers
It is not too far-fetched to suggest that there seems to have arisen in Parliament about
accountability for the exercise of prerogative powers something not dissimilar to the
reasons which prompted reconsideration of the reviewability of prerogative powers
undertaken by the courts in the GCHQ case. It is a recognition that it is the substance or
effects of these great but ancient and arbitrary powers which should determine how
their use is controlled. In any event, the absence of real accountability is itself a defect
for the governing of a modern State, even if any discrete use of a power was beyond
criticism. The courts could see no substantive difference between powers based on
statute (and therefore subject to judicial review) and some of those ﬁnding their source
in the prerogative (and, apparently, beyond judicial supervision). Some of the
Parliamentary activity about prerogative powers is based on similar concerns about
mechanisms of accountability. It would be unrealistic not to recognize that it is an-
ticipated by reformers that some decisions would come out differently if taken under
transparent and accountable conditions, than they would if the Government was able to
rely on the existing dispensations which regulate the prerogative. Once the courts took
on the task of supervising the prerogative, they found it necessary to accept some limits
to their authority, but these were functional and prudential rather than formal. The
20 G Marston, ‘Armed Intervention in the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis: The Legal Advice
Tendered to the British Government’ (1988) 37 ICLQ 773.
21 HC Constitutional Affairs Committee, ‘Constitutional Role of the Attorney General’
(2007) HC 306. 22 GB paras 52–6.
23 ‘The Governance of Britain: A Consultation on the Role of the Attorney General’ (2007)
Cm 7192. 24 GB para 18.
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limits which the courts saw on their powers with respect to the prerogative were based
on various considerations of justiciability—that some matters were ‘political’, ‘without
manageable judicial standards’, and so beyond the competence of the courts.25 It is the
exercise of these powers where attention on the defects of political accountability has
been most marked. However, some of these powers, most notably the power to deploy
armed forces overseas, are subject to the constraints of international law, where the
non-justiciability claim of the national courts has a different ﬂavour. The UK courts
sometimes will take international law into account, even without express statutory
authority to do so.26 Indeed, it has been said that that the protection of the rule of law
requires judges to do so.27 That the judicial writ appears not to run all the way against
the Government28 goes against present trends about the courts’ access to international
law and increases the responsibility of Parliament to assert itself, even against the
considerable (and necessary) power of the Executive. If the domestic forum for some
matters of international law is the political sphere, it will be the case that international
law will be one of many factors conditioning decision-making, not having the same
weight as it would in the courts.
B. The Prerogative Power to Deploy Armed Force Overseas
Of the ministerial prerogative powers identiﬁed in the Green Paper, two are referred to
in more detail—the power to deploy the armed forces and the power to make and ratify
treaties. The formal position is that the decision to use the armed forces overseas may
be taken by the Government without any need for authorization or endorsement by
Parliament. Such decisions appear to be beyond the reach of judicial review, even if the
case sought to be made is that the deployment would be contrary to international law.
There have been attempts to put this power on a statutory footing but they have
failed.29 The House of Lords Constitution Committee recommended the development
of a convention which would require the House of Commons to vote in favour of non-
emergency deployments.30 With emergency operations excluded (which really means
national self-defence measures), internationally lawful operations involve an element
of choice by the Government and, usually, there would be sufﬁcient time for con-
sideration to be given to any British participation in the action. There may be an
invitation from a foreign government to provide assistance; there may be a Security
Council resolution authorizing action as necessary pre-conditions—neither would ob-
lige a response by the UK. Accordingly, the political sentiment has been growing that
operations of this kind need a democratic endorsement for both reasons of legitimacy
and for assuring the troops themselves that there is support for them. That, of course,
is what the Government said did happen about Iraq and would always happen in
the future, the implication being that the Commons would be required to vote on the
25 GCHQ (n 12).
26 For a general account, see R Gardiner, International Law (Longman, London, 2003) ch 4.
In particular, Kuwait Airlines v Iraqi Airlines (No 2) [2002] UKHL 19.
27 R v Horseferry Road Magistrates Court ex p Bennett [1994] AC 42.
28 For instance, on the deployment power, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament v Prime
Minister [2002] 2759.
29 For references, see ‘Waging War . . .’ (n 16) para 80. The latest is a private member’s bill,
Waging War (Parliament’s Role and Responsibility) Bill, introduced by Michael Meacher MP in
December 2006. 30 ‘Waging War . . .’ (n 16).
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deployment, with the implication that if the vote were not in favour of sending the
armed forces, they would not go.31 There are reasons for scepticism about this con-
clusion. Coincidentally, while this view was being put to the Constitution Committee,
the Government was engaged in strengthening its military commitment in Afghanistan
(a deployment which it seems likely the Committee would have envisaged falling
within those which should need authorization) but was conﬁning itself to making
statements to Parliament about its intentions without providing the opportunity for a
full-scale debate. More to the point was that the decision about Iraq was clouded by
uncertainty about the adequacy of the intelligence information and its use by the
Government about the situation in Iraq, and by doubts about the way in which the
Attorney-General’s opinion about the international legality of the attack had been
arrived at.32 What was wanted was not merely information on these questions but
better assurances about its weight and authority—by proposing the development of
convention, the Constitution Committee thought that these matters of detail could be
ﬁlled out—both what the informational pre-conditions should be and what degree
of accountability for the information provided was appropriate. The Green Paper
now says:
The Government will propose that the House of Commons develop a parliamentary con-
vention that could be formalised by resolution. In parallel, it [the Government] will give
further consideration to the option of legislation, taking account of the need to preserve
ﬂexibility and security of the Armed Forces. It will be important to strike a balance be-
tween providing Parliament with enough information to make an informed decision while
restricting the disclosure of information to maintain operational security.33
There is no mention of access to the legal advice on the position in international law on
which the Government founds its right to take action. This is important because, in the
absence of legislation, international law provides the only legal yardstick to measure
the legality of a proposed action. If the House of Commons is to be properly informed,
any opinion should be sufﬁciently detailed and presented in a timely manner which
would allow for its considered assessment. It appears that the question of legality is one
which matters increasingly to senior military commanders.34 As more information has
become available about the way in which the Attorney-General reached his view on the
legality of the Iraq operation, which he put to the House of Lords on 17 March 2003,
the less convincing it has become.35 In controversial cases in future, it might well be
that the House of Commons would be inclined to obtain its own legal advice, however
handicapped any adviser might be by his limited access to information. One matter
which remains unaddressed is the continuing role of the Attorney-General in super-
vising continued compliance with the terms of his advice, where that advice admits
only a speciﬁcally limited right to use force. Here, the distinction which the
31 Lord Falconer, oral answers to questions 270 and 271, ‘Waging War . . .’, Vol II (2006) HL
236-II.
32 For the relevant documentation and detail, see ‘Freedom of Information Enforcement
Notice’ and ‘Attorney-General’s Ofﬁce Disclosure Statement—Iraq Legal Advice’ (22May 2006),
<http://www.attorneygeneral.gov.uk/sub_disclosure_log_2006.html>.
33 GB para 29.
34 Lord Bramhall, answer to question 109, ‘Waging War . . .’ Vol II (n 31).
35 See P Sands, Lawless World (rev edn, Penguin, London, 2006) ch 12, ‘This Wretched Legal
Advice’.
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Constitution Committee tried to stick to between the decision to deploy force and
operational decisions about how it is used would become harder to maintain.36 One
might like to think if Parliament goes as far as it can, any gap left about the inter-
national legality of a military action would be regarded as a matter which the courts
could take on, but the indications are all against it.37
The Consultation Document on the Attorney-General asks whether the proposals in
the Green Paper to put some prerogative powers on a statutory footing should involve
any reconsideration of the Attorney-General’s role and where Parliament is given a
scrutiny function, whether or not it should have access to any germane legal advice
from the Attorney.38 Although some previous Attorneys have described their position
by the homely (but quite inappropriate) simile of the family solicitor39—an analogy
from which Lord Goldsmith quite properly distanced himself40—there is a signiﬁcant
difference between ordinary practitioners and the Law Ofﬁcers on the matter of con-
ﬁdentiality of their opinions. The Law Ofﬁcers’ opinions are protected by professional
privilege but the present ministerial code goes further, saying that even whether or not
the Attorney General has been consulted, as well as any opinion which he gives may
not be revealed without his consent.41 It is a protection which has come under chal-
lenge.42 If, as a result of the consultation, the Attorney-General’s position were fun-
damentally changed, doubtless access to his advice would change too. As things stand,
there may be reasons why conﬁdentiality should be maintained but surely better ones
can be found than that prayed in aid by Lord Goldsmith before the Constitution
Committee, that advice might be different if the advisor knew that it might be re-
vealed.43
C. The Prerogative Power to Negotiate and Ratify Treaties
The prerogative power to negotiate and conclude treaties puts the Government in
a powerful position. It does not need to seek a negotiating mandate from Parliament
and can keep its positions conﬁdential until the conclusion of negotiations. There are
signiﬁcant, indirect limitations on the power (and, exceptionally, there may be legis-
lative conditions attached). Where the implementation of a treaty requires action in
domestic law, implementing legislation is required in order to do this. The
Government’s control in Parliament and the likelihood that a treaty would have to be
accepted in its totality by Parliament as legislator diminishes the actual bite of this
constraint but, nonetheless, the practice is not to ratify any treaty which will require
implementing legislation until it has been obtained. The Ponsonby Rule which requires
that treaties which come into force on ratiﬁcation must ﬁrst be laid before both Houses
of Parliament has been supplemented by an undertaking that time for a debate would
be provided where major political issues would be raised by ratiﬁcation and by the
36 See ‘Waging War . . .’ (n 16) para 13.
37 CND (n 26) and R v Jones [2006] UKHL 16.
38 (n 23) paras 1.15, 2.3, 2,4.
39 Lord Morris of Aberavon, answer to question 210, ‘Waging War . . .’ Vol II (n 31).
40 ibid, question 238.
41 Minsiterial Code (2007) para 2.13.
42 For instance by Harriet Harman MP, then Minister for Constitutional Affairs, The
Guardian (1 Feb 2007) 6.
43 ‘Waging War . . .’ Vol II (n 31) answer to question 242.
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practice of governments to append explanatory memoranda to treaties so laid before
Parliament.44 However, as the Green Paper acknowledges, debates have been rare. The
controversy about the UK–US extradition treaty has focused attention on the domestic
effects of treaties but it is not clear that it was the use of the prerogative that was
responsible for what are claimed to be its defects—these occur because of the drafting
of the Extradition Act, which allowed for unilateral implementation of the treaty (and
which provided the power of extending the ‘no prima facie case’ option to States like
the United States).45 It should be noted that the prerogative power extends to the details
of treaty arrangements—making and withdrawing reservations, accepting and altering
optional provisions and withdrawing from treaties altogether lie in the hands of the
Government.46 In the past, the political nature of treaty-making and the need for con-
ﬁdentiality in the negotiating process has underpinned governments’ objections to
changes in the legal basis governing treaty participation. Now, in the Green Paper, this
Government says:
[It] believes that the procedure for allowing Parliament to scrutinise treaties should be
formalised. The Government is of the view that Parliament may wish to hold a debate and
vote on some treaties and, with a view to its doing so, will therefore consult on an appro-
priate means to put the Ponsonby Rule on a statutory footing.47
This is a limited concession but it draws the line between conclusion of a treaty text
(for the Government) and participation by the UK in the treaty (in some cases requiring
Parliamentary approval). Pre-ratiﬁcation scrutiny on an intermittent basis goes on al-
ready. In addition to the examples above,48 beginning with consideration of the 14th
Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights,49 the Joint Committee on
Human Rights (JCHR) has included pre-ratiﬁcation scrutiny of treaties with human
rights implications in its work programme.50 In addition, the House of Lords
Committee engages in scrutiny of EC treaties. This practice suggests that there is no
reason why other select committees should not do the same for treaties which fall
within their mandates. Whether such developments, which go much further than what
is proposed in the Green Paper, would be welcomed by Departments is not certain. The
recourse to Memoranda of Understanding, where that is a constitutional possibility,51
would provide a way round any obstacles Departments ﬁnd uncongenial. It, though,
might be thought that there is too ready a recourse to MOUs as it is. The JCHR sees
an enhancement of the legitimacy of human rights treaties coming from their pre-
ratiﬁcation scrutiny, a position perhaps inﬂuenced by the stance of its legal adviser,
44 See (n 11) and C Warbrick, ‘Treaties: Recent Developments’ (2000) 49 ICLQ 944.
45 Bermingham and others (R on the application of ) v Director of the Serious Fraud Ofﬁce
and the Home Secretary [2006] EWHC (Admin) 2000; see C Warbrick, ‘Recent Developments in
UK Extradition Law’ (2007) 56 ICLQ 199.
46 For instance, the recent amendment to the UK’s acceptance of the Optional Clause juris-
diction of the ICJ, see ‘UKMIL 2004’ (2004) 75 BYIL 803.
47 GB, para 33. 48 Notes 12 and 13.
49 ‘First Report, Protocol No 14 to the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2004) HL8/
HC106.
50 ‘The Committee’s Future Working Practices’ (2006) HL239/HC1575, para 68. On re-
servations to human rights treaties, see Lord Chancellor’s Department, ‘Report on the UK’s Inter-
Departmental Review of the UK’s position under various International Human Rights
Instruments’ (2004) and JCHR, ‘Review of International Human Rights Instruments’ (2005)
HL99/HC264. 51 ‘UKMIL 2005’ (2005) 76 BYIL 703.
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Murray Hunt, who takes an expansive view of the domestic legal effects of human
rights treaties, implemented by legislation or not.52
The legitimacy argument is an important one, all the same, even if it does not carry
quite the same weight for treaties in general. All attempts to secure greater account-
ability for the exercise of prerogative powers encounter objections that the costs of
doing so will be to undermine the effectiveness of government decision-making and
action. It is a theme of the Green Paper that this is sometimes a price which will be
worth paying—sometimes, but not always, the Green Paper says that none of its pro-
posals concern the ‘uses of the royal prerogative in countries and British Overseas
Territories other than the UK of which The Queen is the Monarch.’53 However, for the
UK, the Green Paper is only a beginning. It deals with ‘some speciﬁc concerns’ but the
Government says that it intends to begin ‘a modern, systematic reform of the scope and
nature of the prerogative powers’.54 One thing the Government may do is to clear away
obsolete powers—of course, it gives the example of impressment to the navy—at least,
it ‘will consider options for ending them’.55 This is a rejection of any doctrine of
obsolescence of prerogative powers and, if it be legally sound, the repeal of some of
these ancient doctrines is most desirable: disinterring them for proper burial might be
tricky, though. However, we may be sure that one item in the list of powers set out
above, the conduct of diplomacy,56 is not among them and that the conduct of foreign
policy will be in the future largely on a government’s terms.
The Government published a further Green Paper, ‘The Governance of Britain—War,
Powers and Treaties: Limiting Executive Powers’ (cm 7239), inviting replies to a
number of detailed questions on possible reforms by early in 2008.
COLIN WARBRICK*
52 M Hunt, Using Human Rights Law in English Courts (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1997).
53 GB, para 49, n 13 (emphasis added). No concessions about the use of the power being
contested in Bancoult (n 9). 54 ibid para 49.
55 ibid para 17. 56 Note 4.
* Barber Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Birmingham.
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